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Help Wanted: Seeking One Good Appellate Brief That Forces the
Arkansas Supreme Court to Clarify its Criminal Discovery
Jurisprudence
Brian R. Gallini*
Pop quiz:1 a prosecutor here in Arkansas is interested in
prosecuting a bank officer for fraud. He has little evidence against
the officer, Smith, but a cooperating witness claims to know Smith
and offers to help. This witness, Jones, has already been charged
with four counts of tax evasion and offers to plead to guilty if the
state agrees not to prosecute his company, its affiliates, or his
family for their involvement in his tax schemes. The prosecutor
accepts his plea on the condition that he provides all information
about bribes he paid to Smith in connection with the tax scheme.
Jones agrees and the prosecutor schedules a debriefing session
with Jones and his attorney.
At the debriefing session, the prosecutor tells Jones that he must
provide all relevant information about both his tax evasion scheme
and any personal knowledge about Mr. Smith’s improprieties.
Knowing that his wife was intimately involved in the tax scheme,
the prosecutor begins the session by asking Jones the following
“softball”: “did your wife help you facilitate your tax evasion
scheme?” To the prosecutor’s surprise, Jones lies by emphatically
answering “no.” “Could we have a minute,” counsel for Jones
then asks. “Of course,” the prosecutor replies. After a break,
Jones acknowledges his wife’s involvement in the tax scheme and
the prosecutor agrees to give him a “fresh start.” Jones then
proceeds to provide intimate incriminating details about Smith’s
involvement in the criminal endeavor. Now, the question: at a
subsequent prosecution of Smith where Jones is the sole witness
against Smith, must the prosecutor – in response to counsel for
Smith’s specific discovery request for “inconsistent witness
statements” – turn over the fact that Jones lied before incriminating
Smith?2 If the prosecutor elects not to disclose the fact of Jones’
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas-Fayetteville.

1

The “quiz” is loosely based on the facts of United States v. Brechner,
99 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996). Although the issue in Brechner focused on whether
the government breached its obligations pursuant to a plea agreement, the facts
nicely raise collateral questions about its discovery obligations. Id. at 97-100
(providing facts relevant to the above hypothetical).
2

Notably, the constitutional rules of criminal discovery apply to
requests for impeachment evidence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls
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lie, has he violated Smith’s federal or state constitutional rights?
Alternatively, has he violated any of the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure?
This Essay first argues that Arkansas has yet to conclusively
provide an answer to these important questions. More importantly,
however, this Essay contends that, in answering these questions,
the Arkansas Supreme Court should require prosecutors to turn
over all statements in response to a specific discovery request even
if those statements are only arguably “material” and “favorable to
the accused.” Doing so would provide to defendants more
protection pursuant to the Arkansas Constitution than they now
enjoy under the Federal Constitution. Part I outlines current
Arkansas discovery practice pursuant to state rules of criminal
procedure, the Federal Constitution, and pertinent judicial
pronouncements addressing relevant discovery issues. Part II then
briefly suggests to defense counsel a conceptual map designed to
force the Arkansas Supreme Court to plug the numerous and
ambiguous holes in its criminal discovery jurisprudence. The
Essay concludes by arguing that Arkansas prosecutors should turn
over to defense counsel all arguably favorable evidence where
there is a reasonable possibility that non-disclosure could be
outcome determinative.
I.
In response to a specific defense request for discovery, prosecutors
everywhere must consider their response in the context of both
federal constitutional principles and governing state procedural
rules. This section considers those principles and their impact on
an intentional or negligent prosecutorial failure to, in keeping with
the Smith/Jones hypothetical, turn over the fact of Jones’ lie during
the debriefing to counsel for Smith. Part A considers what role the
federal constitution, via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, plays in this context. Part B then analyzes what place
state rules occupy in prosecutorial discovery responses. Finally,
Part C explores what the Arkansas State Supreme Court might say
about the state’s suppression of Jones’ lie.
A. Federal Constitutional Discovery.

within [the] general rule [of Brady].” (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
269 (1959))); accord Smith v. State, 932 S.W.2d 753, 754 (Ark. 1996) (“[Rule
17.1(d)] applies to exculpatory and impeachment evidence.” (citing Yates v.
State, 794 S.W.2d 133 (Ark. 1990))).

2
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Wholly apart from the discovery obligations imposed upon the
government by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the
prosecution to disclose evidence that is “material” either to the
guilt or punishment of the accused.3 The prosecutor in every case
must therefore make an objective threshold determination of
whether it is appropriate to turn over a certain piece of evidence.4
Now, regardless of his subjective motivations,5 let’s assume that
the prosecutor decides not to disclose the fact of Jones’ lie at the
debriefing to counsel for Smith. Smith is subsequently convicted
and learns about Jones’ lie from counsel for Jones. On appeal,
counsel for Smith contends that the prosecutor violated his client’s
due process rights by failing to disclose Jones’ lie. Did the
prosecutor have a constitutional obligation to disclose the lie?
Probably not, although it depends on the definition of “material.”
At first, the 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland6 appeared to
define “material” broadly.
Although the definition lacked
precision, the Court suggested that “material” evidence is that
“which, if made available, would tend to exculpate [the defendant]
or reduce the penalty.”7 In 1976, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Agurs8 seemingly narrowed that definition by
characterizing “material” evidence as evidence of “obviously
exculpatory character”; in other words, evidence that “creates a
3

See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

4

On this point, one scholar observed that it will perhaps be the rare
case when a prosecutor possesses evidence of a defendant’s innocence and yet
seeks to pursue a conviction. Scott Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and
Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGeorge L. Rev.
643, 659 (2002). But perhaps the better point is that, regardless of the good or
bad faith of the prosecutor, the defendant will learn about the prosecutor’s
erroneous decision, if ever, only later in the appellate context.
5

The Court has thematically indicated that the good or bad faith of the
prosecution in the context of evidence suppressed by the prosecution at the
discovery phase is irrelevant. E.g., Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (emphasis
added)). Indeed, the bad faith of the state plays a role only if it fails to preserve
evidence. See Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (holding that
“unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due
process of law”).
6

373 U.S. 83 (1963)

7

Id. at 87-88.

8

427 U.S. 97 (1978).
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reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.”9 Given that such
evidence will so clearly support a defendant’s innocence, the Court
reasoned “no significant difference [exists] between cases in which
there has been merely a general request for exculpatory matter and
cases . . . in which there has been no request at all.”10 Yet, the
Court cautioned that the government’s refusal to disclose
exculpatory material in response to defense counsel’s specific
request is “seldom, if ever, excusable.”11
Perhaps, then, we must examine the nature of counsel for Smith’s
discovery request more closely. For example, is it constitutionally
significant if counsel requested “all Brady material” as opposed to
the request in this hypothetical for “all contradictory witness
statements”? Although Agurs would emphatically answer “yes,”12
the Supreme Court’s answer now is undoubtedly “no.”
In 1985, a badly fractured Supreme Court held, in United States v.
Bagley,13 that in all Brady-type cases – regardless of the nature of
defense counsel’s discovery request – appellate courts should
apply the Agurs standard.14 Thus, even in cases where defense
counsel has made a specific discovery request, reviewing courts
need only ask whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”15 No longer relevant, then, is Brady’s sweeping
9

Id. at 112.

10

Id. at 107.

11

Id. at 106.

12

Id. (“The test of materiality in a case like Brady in which specific
information has been requested by the defense is not necessarily the same as in a
case in which no such request has been made.”).
13

473 U.S. 667 (1985).

14

Id. at 682 (“We find the Strickland [v. Washington] formulation of
the Agurs test for materiality sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no request,’
‘general request,’ and ‘specific request’ cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused.”).
15

Id. The Court has since purportedly clarified the definition of
“materiality” on two subsequent occasions. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 299-300 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
In Kyles, the Court observed, “[t]he question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence [the defendant] received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” 514 U.S. at
434. The Kyles Court further articulated that (1) a defendant shows a BradyBagley violation by demonstrating that “the favorable evidence could reasonably
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definition of “material” or Agurs’ caution that the prosecutorial
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in response to a specific
request is “seldom ever excusable.” Perhaps, then, Justice Stevens
in dissent righty accused the Bagley majority of re-writing Brady.16
Justice Stevens’ criticisms aside, we are now ready to answer the
question posed at the outset: has our hypothetical prosecutor
violated Smith’s federal due process rights by suppressing
evidence that Jones lied at the debriefing? In other words, is there
a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different had counsel for Smith known that Jones lied?
Unlikely. Keep in mind that whether counsel for Smith made a
specific discovery request for “inconsistent witness statements” –
as opposed to a general request for “all Brady material” – is
immaterial.17 Given that Jones was charged with tax evasion,
counsel for Smith already had plenty of ammunition to discredit
Jones’ testimony in the eyes of Bagley.
Although faithful to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the
suggestion that our hypothetical prosecutor engaged in
constitutionally acceptable behavior seems uncomfortable at best
and, if intentional, unethical at worst. If indeed the disputed
evidence – Jones’ lie – is cumulative in light of the charges, then
that should clearly suggest the better practice: disclosure, not
suppression. Regardless, Smith finds no constitutional remedy in
the federal Constitution’s due process clause for the prosecutor’s
conduct in this case.
B. State Discovery Practice.
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1 governs the
government’s disclosure obligations. At the outset, it bears noting
Rule 17.1 provides defendants with significantly broader discovery
rights than does its federal counterpart.18 Indeed, pursuant to Rule
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict,” id.; (2) harmless error review is inappropriate
because no Brady-Bagley error could ever be harmless, id. at 435; and (3)
materiality considers the totality of suppressed evidence, not item-by-item, id. at
436-37. Accord Greene, 527 U.S. at 290 (reaffirming that the question for
“materiality” is “whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to
put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict.’” (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435)).
16

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

17

Id. at 682.

18

In contrast to Rule 17.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure demands little
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17.1(a), the government “shall disclose” (1) the names of potential
witnesses, (2) statements made by either the defendant or his codefendant(s), (3) grand jury minutes pertaining to defendant’s
testimony, (4) expert reports, (5) tangible objects belonging to the
defendant, and (6) whether any of its witnesses have a criminal
record.19
Assuming defense counsel makes a timely request, Rule 17.1(b)
further obligates the government to inform the defense of “the
substance of any relevant grand jury testimony,”20 whether law
enforcement has performed any electronic surveillance of
defendant or his property,21 and the nature of prospective
witnesses’ relationship to the prosecutor.22 And, Rule 17.1(c)
requires the state to allow “inspection, testing, copying, and
photocopying” by the defendant “of any relevant material
regarding: (i) any specific searches and seizures; [and] (ii) the
acquisition of specified statements from the defendant.”23
Most relevant to our hypothetical, however, is Rule 17.1(d), which
requires the prosecutor to “disclose to defense counsel any material
or information within his knowledge, possession, or control, which
tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged
or would tend to reduce the punishment therefor.”24
With this primer on Arkansas state discovery in mind, has our
hypothetical prosecutor violated non-constitutional discovery
principles? Certainly, the failure to disclose Jones’ lie in the
debriefing to counsel for Smith does not implicate any portion of
either Rules 17.1(a) or 17.1(b). If anything, the government’s
from the government. Pursuant to Rule 16, federal defendants are entitled to (1)
any oral statements defendant made to a government agent, FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(1)(A); (2) any statements defendant made post-arrest or to the grand jury,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii); (3) a copy of defendant’s own criminal
record, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D); (4) any of defendant’s documents in the
government’s possession that are “material” and that the government intends to
use at trial, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i)-(iii); (5) copies of scientific tests that
are “material” to preparing defendant’s defense, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F)(i)(iii); and (6) copies of any written summaries of expert testimony that the
government intends to use in its case-in-chief, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G).
19

ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(a)(i)-(vi).

20

ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(b)(i).

21

ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(b)(ii).

22

ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(b)(iii).

23

ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(c)(i)-(ii).

24

ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(d) (emphasis added).
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decision to suppress Jones’ lie arguably implicates only Rule
17.1(d), which again obligates the government to disclose anything
that tends to negate Smith’s guilt or innocence – language that
incorporates the Supreme Court’s holding in Brady.25 We are left,
then, to wonder how much Rule 17.1(d) obligates the prosecution
to disclose to defense counsel and whether, in answering that
question, it depends on the specificity of counsel’s request.
Of course, that raises a collateral question: wholly apart from Rule
17.1, what role does the due process clause of the Arkansas
constitution play? Given that a criminal defendant is always
entitled to argue that his state’s constitution provides to him more
protection than does its federal counterpart,26 perhaps Arkansas
appellate courts apply different standards to claims of prosecutorial
non-compliance with specific, as opposed to general, defense
requests for discovery. Stated differently, does Arkansas apply
the Bagley “reasonable probability” standard regardless of the
nature of defense counsel’s discovery request? Let’s take each
question in turn.
C. Where do Arkansas courts stand?
By way of background, many states unsatisfied with Bagley’s
“reasonably probability” appellate standard for judging
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence in response to
specific defense requests have relied on their own state

25

Yates v. State, 794 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Ark. 1990) (“Rule 17.1(d)
incorporates the due process requirement that evidence favorable to a defendant
on issues of guilt or punishment be disclosed by the prosecutor.” (citing Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
26

ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 8 (“[N]or shall any person be compelled, in
any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.”); see Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714,
719 (1975) (observing that “a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary
upon federal constitutional standards” (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,
62 (1967)). The Arkansas Supreme Court has, on several occasions, granted to
its citizens more rights under the state due process clause than are granted by the
federal due process clause. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 351
(Ark. 2002) (recognizing homosexuals as “a separate and identifiable class for
purposes of equal-protection analysis”); State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 221
(Ark. 2002) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to pretextual arrests);
Box v. State, 71 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Ark. 2002) (holding that a defendant has the
right not to appear in prison garb, which includes county-jail clothing); Griffin
v. State, 67 S.W.3d 582, 589-91 (Ark. 2002) (holding that officers’ “knock and
search” of defendant’s home using flashlights to look inside defendant’s sliding
glass door was unconstitutional).
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constitutions to reject the standard.27 In People v. Vilardi,28 for
example, the New York Court of Appeals expressly adopted a
“reasonable possibility” standard as the appropriate standard to use
when the defense makes a specific discovery request. In doing so,
the court reasoned that applying Bagley both to the specific and
general request cases diminishes the prosecutor’s incentive, first, to
respond at all and, second, to “thoroughly [ ] review files for
exculpatory material, or to err on the side of disclosure where
exculpatory value is debatable.”29 Thus, in New York, “a showing
of a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the failure to disclosure the
exculpatory [evidence] contributed to the verdict remains the
appropriate standard to measure materiality, where the prosecutor
was made aware by a specific discovery request that defendant
considered the material important to the defense.”30
Whether Arkansas has, for state constitutional due process
discovery purposes, adopted the Bagley standard is hardly clear.
Indeed, the few published Arkansas cases to consider the issue
hopelessly blend federal and constitutional standards without
distinction and without regard to the nature of defense counsel’s
discovery request. In doing so, Arkansas appellate courts also
problematically interweave the non-constitutional discovery
standards imposed by Rule 17.1. In short, the courts appear to
treat constitutional discovery and non-constitutional discovery
identically while disregarding the presence or absence of a
defendant’s specific discovery request at trial.
The first Arkansas case to deal with the Brady-Agurs-Bagley line
of cases in any substance was the 1988 decision in Strobbe v.
State.31 In Strobbe, defendant made a specific discovery request
that, in part, sought “the substance of any oral statement by any
person expected to give evidence at the trial and any other
27

See, e.g., Jimenez v. State, 918 P.2d 687, 692 (Nev. 1996); State v.
Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Minn. 1992); State v. Engel, 592 A.2d 572, 599
(N.J. App. Div. 1991); Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 502 N.E.2d 516, 519 n.5
(Mass. 1987).
28

555 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1990).

29

Id. at 920.

30

Id. (emphasis added).

31

752 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1988). Other earlier Arkansas cases mentioned
Bagley after its issuance, but never discussed its impact on criminal discovery
practice in any meaningful depth. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, No. CR 86-51,
1986 Ark. LEXIS 1957, *12 (Ark. June 16, 1986) (unpublished); Alfay v. State,
No. CR 86-1, 1986 Ark. LEXIS 1762, *2 (Ark. Feb. 18, 1986) (unpublished);
McClendon v. State, No. CR 86-1, 1986 Ark. LEXIS 1692, *2 (Ark. Jan. 13,
1986) (unpublished); Orsini v. State, 701 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Ark. 1985).
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evidence now known or which through the exercise of due
diligence could be learned by the prosecution which otherwise
reflects upon the credibility, competency, bias or motive of the
prosecution’s witnesses.”32 Notwithstanding that request, the
defense did not learn until after trial that a key state witness had
changed his story and admitted involvement in the charged
offense.33
Somewhat confusingly, the state argued on appeal that disclosure
was not required either by Rule 17.1, Brady, or Bagley.34 The
court disagreed and, in doing so, awarded to defendant a new
trial.35 Although the court reasoned, “the impeachment evidence
that [the witness] was in fact a participant in the crime falls within
the realm of information subject to discovery and the rule
enunciated in Brady and Bagley,”36 it thereafter only analyzed
whether the state’s suppression denied to defendant a fair trial.37
Significantly, the court neither addressed the state’s Rule 17
argument, nor indicated whether its discussion of Brady and
Bagley related to federal or state due process standards.
The court in Yates v. State38 did little to clarify the issue two years
later. In Yates, defendant was convicted of two counts of rape and,
on appeal, contended in part that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to require disclosure of his polygraph test results.39 His
motion stemmed from the state’s refusal to disclose those results
after he served a discovery request on the state seeking “any oral
statements made by him, as well as any reports or statements made
by experts relating to the results of physical or mental
examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons.”40 In
rejecting the state’s argument that polygraph test results were
“work product,” the court held that Rule 17.1(d) obligated
prosecutorial disclosure of the polygraph results.41
32

Strobbe, 752 S.W.2d at 31.

33

Id. at 30.

34

Id. at 31.

35

Id. at 32-33.

36

Id. at 32.

37

Id. (“The error consisted of the withholding of significant evidence
which denied [defendant] a fair trial.”).
38

794 S.W.3d 133 (Ark. 1990).

39

Id. at 133.

40

Id. at 133-34.

41

Id. at 135.
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Far more importantly than the holding, the court reasoned, “Rule
17.1(d) incorporates the [Brady] due process requirement that
evidence favorable to a defendant on issues of guilt or punishment
be disclosed by the prosecutor.”42 The court continued by noting
that it viewed Rule 17.1(d) as “an extension of the Brady
mandate.”43 Although such language seemingly suggested that the
court recognized the importance of separating non-constitutional
(rule-based) discovery from constitutional discovery, it then
quizzically relied on Bagley to insist that defendant “demonstrate a
reasonably probability that the result would have been different
had he had the information.”44 The Yates decision therefore
seemed only to confuse further the issues of whether (1) Arkansas
adopted Bagley as a matter of state constitutional law, and (2)
whether Rule 17.1(d) imposed upon the state any different or
additional discovery obligations.
Confused yet? Things seemingly got worse in 1998 when the
court handed down Harrell v. State.45 In Harrell, defendant
appealed from multiple felony convictions, including rape, by
asserting that he deserved a new trial because the state declined to
disclose the victim’s previous plea of guilty to cocaine possession,
notwithstanding defendant’s pretrial discovery motion.46
Defendant cited Brady and argued that the victim’s prior guilty
plea undermined her credibility and was therefore properly
discoverable as exculpatory impeachment evidence.47 Without
mention of Rule 17.1, the state constitution, or the specificity of
defendant’s discovery request, the court summarily relied on
Bagley’s “reasonable probability” standard and held that no error
occurred.48

42

Id. at 136 (citing Brady v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). The court
has often summarily inter-woven the Brady decision with Rule 17.1(d). See,
e.g., Perroni v. State, 186 S.W.3d 206, 214 (Ark. 2004); Esmeyer v. State, 930
S.W.2d 302, 306 (Ark. 1996); Newberry v. State, 557 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Ark.
1977).
43

Id.

44

Yates, 794 S.W.2d at 136.

45

962 S.W.2d 325 (Ark. 1998).

46

See id. at 327. More specifically, defendant contended that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the state’s nondisclosure of the victim’s prior guilty plea. Id.
47

Id. at 328.

48

Id. at 328-29.
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Things remained fuzzy in the court’s most recent pronouncement
on the issue nine years ago. In Lee v. State,49 wherein defendant
appealed his conviction for, inter alia, capital murder, by
contending that the trial court erroneously refused to grant his
motion for a new trial based on the state’s failure disclose
exculpatory impeachment information.50 Prior to trial, defendant
twice filed discovery motions seeking the criminal histories of
state witnesses, yet defendant never learned that three state
witnesses in fact either had prior felony arrests or convictions.51
This information, defendant asserted, would have aided him in
impeaching the state’s witnesses at trial.52
Although the court recognized that then-acted Rule 17.1(a)(vi)
governed the state’s obligation to disclose the criminal histories of
its witnesses,53 it addressed Rule 17.1(d) and Brady-Bagley
collectively as a “corollary issue.”54 In doing so, the court for the
first time adopted the “same reasoning” as Bagley,55 yet declined
to tie Bagley’s reasoning to the due process clause of the Arkansas
Constitution. Equally as analytically problematic, the court cited
Rule 17.1(d) without elaborating on its suggestion in Yates that
Rule 17.1(d) is “an extension of the Brady mandate.” Against that
somewhat bewildering backdrop, the court characterized the state’s
witnesses’ criminal histories as “material,” but found no reversible
error because it could not say there existed “a reasonable
probability that the results of this trial would have been different
even were we to exclude the testimony of [the three challenged
state’s witnesses].”56
II.

49

11 S.W.3d 553 (Ark. 2000).

50

Id. at 555.

51

Id. at 556.

52

Id.

53

Id. In 2000, Rule 17.1(a)(vi) obligated the state to disclose “‘any
record of prior criminal convictions of persons whom the prosecuting attorney
intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or at trial, if the prosecuting attorney
has such information.’” Id. (quoting ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(a)(vi) (2000)).
54

Lee, 11 S.W.3d at 557 (“The corollary issue under this point is
whether the prosecution was required to disclose any criminal information
regarding [its witnesses], even if that information did not solely relate to
criminal convictions.”).
55

Id.

56

Id.
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After Lee, litigants are left to wonder (1) whether Bagley governs
the state’s suppression of exculpatory evidence as a matter of state
constitutional law; (2) whether it is constitutionally significant if
the state suppresses exculpatory evidence in response to defense
counsel’s specific discovery request; and (3) whether Rule 17.1(d)
imposes any additional or different discovery obligations on the
state.
As to the first point, although it is hardly clear from the foregoing
discussion of Arkansas criminal discovery jurisprudence, it appears
that Arkansas is a “Bagley jurisdiction.” Admittedly, the court at
no point expressly adopts Bagley as the governing standard for
purposes of state constitutional due process.57 Perhaps, then, it is
more accurate to say that Arkansas is a Bagley jurisdiction by
default.58 Regardless, as to the second point, let us be clear: the
Arkansas Supreme Court at no point has addressed the state
constitutional significance, if any, between governmental
suppression of exculpatory evidence in response to defense
counsel’s specific or general discovery request.
With that said, however, the wake of confusion left behind by
Strobbe, Yates, Harrell, and Lee, arguably bodes well for defense
counsel. Consider, for example, the hypothetical raised at the
outset of this Essay: given the prosecutor’s suppression of Jones’
lie at the debriefing notwithstanding a specific discovery request,
appellate defense counsel should separately raise three arguments.
First, appellate counsel for Smith should argue that our
hypothetical prosecutor violated federal due process discovery
standards by withholding Jones’ lie. This argument, for reasons
posited earlier, is a likely loser.
More importantly, then, appellate counsel for Smith should argue
that the due process clause in the Arkansas state constitution
provides to its citizens more protection than does the federal due
process clause.59 Counsel should further argue that Agurs – not
Bagley – governs cases involving prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence following a specific discovery request.60
57

As noted, the court came closest in Lee, where in it adopted the
“same reasoning” as Bagley. Id.
58

See, e.g., Lee, 11 S.W.3d at 557 (requiring defendant to satisfy
Bagley’s “reasonable probability” standard); Harrell, 962 S.W.2d at 328 (same);
Yates, 794 S.W.2d at 136 (same).
59

See note 25, supra, and accompanying text.

60

The Arkansas Supreme Court has apparently never considered such
an argument. In fact, the court has only ever cited to Agurs once in addressing a
peripheral issue. See Goodwin v. State, 568 S.W.2d 3, 10 (Ark. 1978).
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Moreover, sound policy favors requiring defendants to show, for
example, only a “reasonable possibility” that the state’s failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence or impeachment statements
contributed to the verdict, particularly where the state knew from a
specific discovery request that defendant considered the material
important. This standard, borrowed from Vilardi, eliminates the
disincentive created by Bagley for the prosecutor, in responding to
a discovery request, to simply undertake a casual review of files
for exculpatory materials. In other words, distinguishing between
specific and general defense discovery requests will encourage
prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure where – as in our
hypothetical – exculpatory value is debatable. After all, absent a
move away from Bagley, how would counsel for Smith ever learn
about Jones’ single oral statement made during a debriefing where
neither counsel for Smith, nor Smith himself, were present?
As to the third and final point, counsel should, if all else fails, rely
on the Yates dicta to assert that, even if Arkansas is a Bagley
jurisdiction for state constitutional purposes, Rule 17.1(d) both
incorporates the broader language of Brady and expands on it.
Surely, then, counsel can correspondingly argue that the
prosecutor’s failure to inform trial counsel of Jones’ lie denied
“evidence favorable to a defendant on [an] issue[ ] of guilt or
punishment,”61 particularly given the shaky credibility of Jones,
the prosecution’s sole witness.
Ideally, a defense brief that clearly provides for the court separate
arguments related the federal constitution, state constitution, and
Rule 17.1(d) will produce an opinion that correspondingly
provides separate rulings and analysis. And, regardless of which
argument prompts the court to address discovery issues related to
the suppression of exculpatory evidence, the court’s message must
be clear: state prosecutors should turn over to defense counsel all
arguably favorable evidence where there is a reasonable possibility
that non-disclosure could be outcome determinative.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing brief analysis suggests that the Arkansas Supreme
Court has its work cut out for it. When, and if, the court will
overhaul its criminal discovery jurisprudence remains to be seen.
Given that the court has not meaningfully discussed Bagley in a
published decision in nine years is simultaneously problematic and
telling. When the time comes, however, the court must be
61

Yates, 794 S.W.2d at 136.
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unmistakably clear in its analysis in order to resolve (1) whether
Bagley governs the prosecution’s suppression of exculpatory
evidence as a matter of state constitutional law; (2) whether it is
constitutionally significant if the state suppresses exculpatory
evidence in response to defense counsel’s specific discovery
request; and (3) whether Rule 17.1(d) imposes any additional or
different discovery obligations on the state. Until that time,
counsel for Smith may never know that Jones lied at the
debriefing.
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